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“Planned Parenthood”: Adoption, Assisted
Reproduction, and the New Ideal Family
Susan Frelich Appleton*
The following essay is based on a presentation by Professor
Susan Appleton on 10 March 1999 as a part of an
interdisciplinary panel discussion of Professor Dorothy
Roberts’ paper.
According to the conventional wisdom in family law, families
formed through adoption are “second best” to those based on
biological ties. Even prevailing terminology, by describing biological
parents as “real” and “natural,”1 repeatedly sends this message about
the inferiority of the adoptive family. This understanding of the
hierarchy of families has received considerable reinforcement in recent
years when several courts resolved highly publicized battles between
adoptive and birth parents by sending the child home with the birth
parents, sometimes despite years of bonding within the adoptive
family.2 These cases appeared to leave no doubt that the law accords
greater protection to the biological or genetic parent-child relationship
than it accords to the psychological or functional family.
Professor Dorothy Roberts has detected a surprising departure
from this conventional wisdom in new federal legislation, specifically
* Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B. Vassar
College; J.D. Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley.
1. See, e.g., In re Petrie, 742 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Ariz. 1987); Bush v. State, Dept. of
Human Resources , 929 P.2d 940, 941 (Nev. 1996); id. at 947-48, 953 (Springer, J., dissenting);
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 269 N.E.2d 787, 791 (N.Y. 1971), cert. denied sub
nom. DiMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
2. See, e.g., In re Petition of John Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 994
(1994) (“Baby Richard” case); In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.), stay denied sub
nom. O’Connell v. Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995); In the Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239
(Iowa 1992) (“Baby Jessica” case).
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the Adoption and Safe Families Act (AFSA),3 which became law in
late 1997. This statute and its legislative history stand the usual
approach on its head. As Roberts points out, AFSA, which seeks to
speed terminations of parental rights for children in foster care and to
increase adoptions, portrays adoptive families as “real,” safe, and
loving.4 By contrast, AFSA depicts biological families as artificial,
risky, and violent.5 Roberts identifies as the flaw in the statute its
failure to address the underlying problems that result in the placement
in foster care of an astonishingly large number of children—a group
that is disproportionately poor and Black. Proper attention to these
underlying problems would, in her view, entail offering necessary
support to poor families and affording to many children continuing
connections to their birth families. Under Roberts’ approach, the
fundamental question asks not how we can increase adoptions of
children in foster care but rather how we can reduce the number of
children who enter foster care in the first place.6
While startling at first, the suggestion that AFSA favors adoptive
families over biological families, upon reflection, coincides with other
developments in family law. The rhetorical preference for the adoptive
family that Roberts finds in AFSA forms part of a larger context from
which emerges a new vision of the ideal family. The ideal family is a
planned family, intentionally created. Ideally, one becomes a parent
through carefully made and intentionally pursued plans. For short, I
shall borrow a familiar phrase to describe this vision of the ideal
family: “planned parenthood.”7 Planned parenthood contrasts with
casual, accidental, and thus irresponsible parenthood.
The creation of a family through adoption or foster care always
3. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified in scattered sections of, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.).
4. Dorothy Roberts, Poverty, Race, and New Directions in Child Welfare Policy, 1 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 66 (1999).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 73.
7. Of course, I have borrowed this phrase from a now well-known organization that
promotes family planning and reproductive freedom. For the history of the national Planned
Parenthood Federation of America and some of the regional and local affiliates, see DAVID J.
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entails planned parenthood. In other words, one cannot become a
foster or adoptive parent accidentally. In contrast, reproduction
through sexual intercourse always suggests at least the possibility of
an unintended child who is the accidental byproduct of activity
undertaken for its own sake.
The rhetoric emerging from the calls for welfare reform just a few
years ago presented childbearing in just this way: The 1996 law
exhorted welfare recipients to take “personal responsibility” for their
sexual activities.8 It purported to send the message that America’s
poor should plan their families, choosing to have children only when
able to support them. In other words, this law signaled that planned
families are good while accidental families are to be discouraged.
About half the states have exercised the freedom given to them by
Congress to impose so-called “child exclusions” (popularly known as
“family caps”9), which decline to provide to welfare recipients
additional subsidies when they have additional children.10 A cording to
the theory underlying the family cap, the additional allotments that
AFDC previously provided for additional children encouraged
additional births. The family cap is supposed to have the opposite
effect, creating the financial disincentives that welfare recipients are
thought to need to curb their irresponsible reproduction.11 Under this
8. Congress’ welfare-reform measures formed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare
Reforms Promote Abortion: “Personal Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to
Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155 (1996); Linda C. McClain, “Irresponsible” Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 339 (1996).
9. For examination of the terminology, see Appleton, supra note 8, at 159-62. See also
DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 210-11 (1999).
10. See Appleton, supra note 8, at 160; Roberts, supra note 9, at 210.
11. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of governmental efforts to use
selective funding for purposes of behavior modification among welfare recipients. The Court’s
abortion-funding cases stand out as the most prominent examples. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980). See Appleton, supra note 8, at 162-65. To the surprise (and delight) of critics of the
Court’s recent welfare jurisprudence, however, a majority of the Justices now have recognized
constitutional limits on state attempts to influence the behavior of welfare recipients. See Saenz v.
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999) (invoking right to travel and Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges or
immunities” clause to strike down California’s provision to new residents the lower welfare
benefits they would have received in state of prior residence, arguably part of an official plan to
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theory, when welfare recipients have children in spite of the family
cap, I suppose there are two possible explanations: (1) These parents
reveal their utter sexual irresponsibility by producing children for
whom they lack adequate financial support (in turn, prompting calls to
send these children to orphanages as punishment12) or (2) These
children must be wanted for their own sake, despite the financial
obstacles—they must be, in a word, “planned.”
The notion of planned parenthood as a value the law should
promote also emerges in the developing legal rules for assisted
reproduction. Modern medical technologies have created new
alternatives to adoption and new ways to separate sex and
reproduction. To say that children born as the result of new
reproductive technologies are always planned and intended is an
understatement. Only individuals and couples who are determined to
create a pregnancy would be willing to undertake the physical,
emotional and financial toll that fertility treatments impose.13
Moreover, in legal controversies sparked by the use of new
reproductive technologies, several courts have turned to “intended
parenthood” as the decisive variable.
The California Supreme Court first blazed this trail in 1993,
relying largely on the approach advocated by Professor Marjorie
McGuire Shultz.14 The court confronted a parentage contest between
the Calverts, a couple who had provided the ovum and sperm, and
Johnson, the “gestational surrogate mother” who had carried the
pregnancy under contract to them.15 Finding that existing California
statutes would identify as the mother both the woman who provided
the genetic material and the woman who gave birth, the court decided
to use intent to tip the balance.16 At the time of the agreement, the
deter their relocation to California).
12. Orphanages figured prominently in the debates about welfare reform. See, e.g., Tom
Morgenthau et al., The Orphanage, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1994, at 28.
13. See generally, e.g., Frontline, Making Babies: A Report on the Science and Ethics of
Assisted Reproduction, PBS, June 1, 1999.
14. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297.
15. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 874 (1993).
16. Id. at 781-83.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol1/iss1/9
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parties intended for the Calverts to rear any child they hoped would
result, and but for the plan of the parties, the child in question never
would have been born. Planned parenthood trumped the nurturing and
bonding that Johnson could claim based on her pregnancy—to the
predictable dismay of some feminists.17
Planning and intent again proved decisive in subsequent California
litigation. Upon divorce just before the birth of Jaycee, who was
conceived in vitro with donor semen and a donor ovum and carried to
term by a woman who agreed to serve as “gestational surrogate,” the
intended father claimed that his absence of biological and formal legal
connection to Jaycee relieved him of child support obligations. The
appellate court ruled against him.18 Emphasizing “the intelligence and
utility of a rule that looks to intentions,”19 the court identified Jaycee’s
parents as the couple who had planned to rear her before they decided
to divorce. But for their plans, Jaycee would not exist.20
Although the first case uses planned parenthood as a sword against
a competing claimant, in the second case planned parenthood works as
a shield to protect the child from abandonment. Together the cases and
Shultz’ analysis on which they rely suggest a new paradigm for family
law: Intentionality and planning are significant, even decisive,
components of legal parentage. Other jurisdictions have embraced this
paradigm.21
“Planned parenthood” acquires an even more forceful meaning in
the growing number of cases seeking to resolve disputes about the
disposition of unused cryopreserved genetic material. In response to
the first reported post-divorce custody battle over frozen pre-embryos
17. See id. at 797-98 (Kennard, J., dissenting). See also BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN,
RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 36
(1989); Anne Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo
Transplantation, and Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275 (1992).
18. In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App.), rev. denied, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3830
(1998).
19. Id. at 290.
20. See id. at 283, 286-91.
21. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (App. Div. 1994). See also
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, Alternative A, § 5, 9B U.L.A. 198 (Supp.
1999); Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Gerber, J.,
concurring). But see Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1994).
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created during happier times in a couple’s marriage,22 ost assisted
reproductive technologies programs now require very specific advance
agreements, detailing the progenitors’ wishes in the event of various
possible future occurrences.23 The New York Court of Appeals
recently relied on a couple’s written contract to determine that the pre-
embryos they created should be donated to scientific research now that
the marriage had ended.24 In addition, the newly emerging search for a
principle with which to approach the question of posthumous
reproduction seems to have settled on a rule that makes the
progenitor’s intent controlling.25
The new emphasis on planning and intent that these cases
exemplify goes a long way, I suspect, in explaining the generally
positive response to the amazing births of sextuplets, then septuplets,
and finally octuplets. Despite medical hazards—not to mention
emotional and financial burdens—the media for the most part have
celebrated these babies and their families and the public has embraced
them.26 Yet in other circumstances, no doubt, parents who find
themselves with more children than they can handle without
considerable assistance from others would be condemned as
“irresponsible.”27 What distinguishes these babies, however, is that
their parents went to considerable trouble to have them. News reports
detailed, for example, how the mother of the octuplets remained
confined almost upside down for weeks to postpone labor and
delivery.28 These parents could have opted for “selective reduction”
22. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis,
506 U.S. 911 (1993).
23. See John A. Robertson, Disposition of Frozen Embryos by Divorcing Couples Without
Prior Agreement, 71 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 996, 996 (1999).
24. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
25. See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993), writ of error granted, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1996) (not to be published); Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 62; John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69
IND. L.J. 1027 (1994); Ann Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901 (1997).
26. See, e.g., Diane Sawyer, Baby, Oh, Baby: The Six-Pack Turns 6, ABC 20/20, May 26,
1999 (largely humorous report celebrating sixth birthday of Dilley sextuplets).
27. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
28. Born in Texas: First Surviving Set of 8 Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1998, at A16.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol1/iss1/9
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but rejected it,29 so the birth of each of these babies was intended and
planned, after thoughtful consideration.30
29. See id.
30. But see David Finkel, “What Kind of Choice Is That?”; Science’s War on Infertility
Can Deliver Painful Decisions, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at A1.
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I have long counted myself among the fans of Dorothy Roberts’
scholarship. What I like best about her work are both her provocative
insights and the clarity with which she is able to “connect the dots” to
reveal a larger picture that is greater than the sum of smaller points
she has synthesized. Certainly, her book Killing the Black Body31
demonstrates these gifts. Today’s paper does so as well with its insight
about AFSA’s surprising message and the larger critique this message
evokes. Professor Roberts has given us much to think about.
I offer the notion of planned parenthood as an additional common
thread that ties together developments in adoption law, welfare reform,
and also the increasing legal attention focused on assisted reproductive
technologies. As for larger issues, for now I shall simply raise two
questions that, in time, deserve our consideration as well.
First, might the emerging ideal of planned parenthood reinvigorate
legal attacks against some of the more extreme anti-abortion selective
funding schemes? As we are discussing these important issues, the
Missouri legislature is attempting to withdraw all public funding from
Planned Parenthood affiliates throughout the state because these
organizations also provide abortion services.32 Th s state action goes
well beyond judicially approved governmental refusals to subsidize
abortion and instead seeks to eliminate all support for the myriad of
other services—family planning, health care, and education—provided
by Planned Parenthood. The dispute continues, with the focus now on
the question whether Planned Parenthood has achieved sufficient
separation between its abortion services and its other services to be
entitled to state funds for the latter.33 If the anti-abortion legislators
prevail, however, they will put at risk not just Planned Parenthood
31. See Roberts, supra note 9.
32. See H.B. 10, section 10.705, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mo. 1999) (legislation passed by
General Assembly specifying separation requirements “for an organization that receives these
[family planning] funds and its independent affiliate that performs abortion services”).
33. See Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d
458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding earlier funding legislation’s restrictions “facially ambiguous”
with respect to whether it “constitutionally restricts the use of funds within the State family-
planning program or unconstitutionally restricts grantee activities outside the program”); Bill Bell,
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affiliates, but also the ability of many families to practice planned
parenthood—notwithstanding the various legal developments we have
seen coalesce in support of this ideal. Can we use the law’s emerging
preference for planned parenthood to defeat the increasingly
aggressive efforts to have anti-abortion “value judgments”34 evisc rate
the entire project of family planning?
The second, larger question rests on a very different observation:
The purposes of adoption as an institution have come full circle.
Historical studies teach us that in ancient times the practice served the
interests of the adopter.35 In American adoption statutes, however, this
objective gave way to a more humanitarian goal, providing for the
welfare of dependent children,36 with the “best interests of the child”
serving as the guiding principle.37 Yet today, the social and legal
context of adoption once again emphasizes adopters’ interests. In this
era of planned parenthood, adoption has become simply one of several
avenues for the infertile to pursue in their quest to create a family.38 In
other words, once again adoptive children primarily serve the needs of
adoptive parents, with any advancement of child welfare an incidental
benefit. We would do well to ask: What can we do to revive the child-
centered focus of adoption law? At the very least we
34. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (invoking official “value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion” to justify governmental subsidy for childbirth but not abortion);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (same).
35. See Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV.
743, 745 (1956); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 446 (1971).
36. See Presser, supra note 35, at 465-89. See also MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S
PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN AMERICA (1994); Jamil
S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and
the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U.L. REV. 1038 (1979).
37. For modern applications of the best-interests test, see, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 551
A.2d 738, 741-42 (Conn. 1988) (supporting “open adoption” arrangement); Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993) (supporting second-parent adoption by lesbian partner of
biological mother).
38. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (observing that woman
who loses opportunity to have her frozen embryos implanted not gravely burdened because “she
could still achieve the child-rearing aspects of parenthood through adoption”), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowe v. Davis, 506 U.S. 911 (1993). See also RESOLVE Fact Sheet Abstracts (visited
June 4, 1999) <http://www.resolve.org/publicat.htm> (website for Resolve, The National
Infertility Association, lists, inter alia, publications on assisted reproductive technologies as well as
adoption).
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might ask what the law can do to make the interests of children
needing adoption39 and those of adults planning parenthood coincide.40
39. Of course, Roberts has given us good reason to question any facile conclusions about
precisely which children “need” adoption. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 64.
40. Some scholarly criticism of assisted reproductive technologies focuses on the need of
many already existing children for adoption. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARHOLET, FAMILY BONDS:
ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING (1993); Rothman, supra note 17. Roberts
emphasizes the racial element that leads couples to attempt assisted reproduction instead of
choosing adoption. Roberts, supra note 9, at 246-93.
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